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I. INTRODUCTION
“Privacy is not something that I’m merely entitled to, it’s an absolute
prerequisite.”1
-Marlon Brando

1

DAVID SHIPMAN, MARLON BRANDO
http://www.bartleby.com/66/59/8159.html.
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Virtually every member of American society has seen a physician and therefore
has some type of medical history. A medical history contains some of the most
intimate details of a person’s life.2 This information might not even be shared with
intimate partners, family or friends,3 perhaps because an individual is usually private,
in denial of an illness, or wishes to guard loved ones from painful information.
Whatever the reason, it is reasonable to conclude that most individuals wish to keep
health information personal and private.
The desire to keep medical information private has been recognized for centuries,
as evidenced by the Hippocratic Oath4 and the common law physician-patient
privilege.5 As healthcare changes, so too must societal conceptions of medical
privacy. Today, medical privacy encompasses not only privileged communications,
but also the power to control medical records and who may access them. Preserving
this power can appropriately be termed protecting medical records privacy.
Unfortunately, three issues threaten the long-recognized right to medical privacy.
First, while the increased use of technology to store and transmit medical records
makes accessing private health information easier for authorized medical personnel,
it also increases the likelihood that the information may be seen and used by those
with ill intentions. Second, the Privacy Rule promulgated under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”)6 actually sanctions
the non-consensual disclosure of personal health information.7 Third, privacy rights
are eroding as a result of measures taken to increase national security in the wake of
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The erosion of privacy rights is illustrated
by the hastily passed USA PATRIOT Act,8 which alters the interpretation of many
privacy oriented statutes and effectively contracts individual privacy rights.9 These
2

Kevin B. Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the Privacy Gap
Between Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 535, 537 (2001) (citing Board of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal.
App. 3d 669, 678 (1979)).
3
Peter P. Swire & Lauren B. Steinfield, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: National Health
Information Privacy Regulations Under HIPAA: Security and Privacy After September 11:
The Health Care Example, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1526-27 (2002).
4

STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 799, cited in Mike Hatch, Modern Studies in Privacy
Law: National Health Information Privacy Regulations Under HIPAA: Commercial Interests
Win Round Two, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1489 (2002).
5

Lawrence O. Gostin and James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIV: AIDS
and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories or Privacy and Disclosure in Partner
Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 9, 42 – 44 (1998).
6

Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 201).

7

Compliance with the Privacy Rule is required no later than April 14, 2003 for “covered
entities” except “small health plans.” “Small health plans” must comply with the Rule by
April 14, 2004. 45 C.F.R. §164.534. See also 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462. A “small health plan” has
annual receipts of less than $5 million. 45 C.F.R. §160.104.
8
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Act of 2001) (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001).
9

Swire & Steinfield, supra note 3, at 1521-22.
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three factors have converged to threaten an individual’s right to medical records
privacy.
Proceeding from the proposition that privacy is a fundamental right, this essay
notes the importance of maintaining medical records privacy in light of the increased
use of technology. It describes the Privacy Rule promulgated under HIPAA, which
was intended to strengthen medical records privacy, but notes the restriction of
privacy rights following September 11, 2001 (“9/11”). In light of circumscribed
privacy rights, the Privacy Rule becomes much more important in protecting medical
records privacy. Unfortunately, the Rule falls short of this goal by potentially
running afoul of the First and Fourth Amendments. It also fails to provide adequate
medical records protection because it: (1) relies on an out of date technology model;
(2) provides too many exceptions to its own consensual disclosure provisions; (3)
lacks specificity in defining the entities it covers; (4) fails to resolve important
federalism issues; and (5) caters to corporate interests. These problems can be
corrected by bolstering computer security, changing the text of the Rule to anchor a
patient’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” and offering the judiciary an avenue to
continue to expand privacy rights despite the nation’s post-9/11 fears.
II. PRIVACY IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
“[T]he makers of our Constitution conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.”10
-Justice Louis Brandeis
While the Constitution does not explicitly grant the right to privacy, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized this guarantee.11 One of the earliest
recognitions of the right to privacy came in the 1891 decision of Union Pacific
Railway v. Botsford.12 Finding that an injured woman could not be required to
submit to a surgical examination to determine the extent of her injuries, the Supreme
Court noted that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . .
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others . . . .”13
The 1928 decision of Olmstead v. United States formally tied privacy rights to
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.14
Justice Brandeis noted in his dissent that the drafters of the Constitution, in an effort
to allow for the pursuit of happiness and to protect the beliefs of Americans,
“conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone.”15 That right, he
asserted, was promulgated in the text of the Fourth Amendment.16 Similarly, in the
10

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).

11

James G. Hodge, Jr., National Health Information Privacy and New Federalism, 14 ND
J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 791, 797 (2000).
12

141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).

13

Id.

14

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.

15

Id.

16

Id.
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1965 decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas noted that the penumbral
zones of privacy stem from the emanations of the Fourth Amendment “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”17 In light of these decisions, privacy may appropriately be
regarded as a fundamental right with a substantial historic pedigree.
Unfortunately, the right to privacy is limited and poorly defined because it
emanates from the penumbras of the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore easily
subject to transgression.18 The right faces further limitation from other social
interests, such as the need for openness and transparency or other compelling State
interests, which are often balanced against it.19
Ferguson v. City of Charleston recently addressed the balance between medical
privacy and State interests.20 In response to the increased use of cocaine by
expectant mothers, The Medical University of South Carolina (“MUSC”) began
screening urine samples of maternity patients suspected of drug use.21 Under MUSC
policy, if a patient tested positive for cocaine use during labor or a prenatal care visit,
medical staff threatened to report the patient’s drug use to law enforcement
officials.22 The patient could avoid criminal sanctions by enrolling in a substance
abuse program.23
The Supreme Court found for the Plaintiffs, stating that MUSC had violated the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.24 In
deciding the case the Court noted that MUSC was subject to the Fourth Amendment
because it was a state hospital.25 It also identified the well-settled principle of law
that urine tests are considered searches under the Fourth Amendment.26 Balancing
the patients’ Fourth Amendment privacy interests against the “special needs” of the
hospital, the Court concluded that the tests were an unreasonable search in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.27 The Court also noted that a patient’s “reasonable
17

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

18

Kevin B. Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the Privacy Gap
Between Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 535, 538 (Summer 2001).
19

Marc Rotenberg, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: Foreward: Privacy and Secrecy After
September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1127 (June 2002).
20

532 U.S. 67 (2001).

21

Samples were screened if a patient met one or more of the following criteria: (1) no
prenatal care; (2) late prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation; (3) incomplete prenatal care; (4)
abruptio placentae; (5) intrauterine fetal death; (6) preterm labor ‘of no obvious cause’; (7)
IUGR (intrauterine growth retardation) ‘of no obvious cause;’ (8) previously known drug or
alcohol abuse; and (9) unexplained congenital anomalies. Id. at 72.
22

Ferguson at 72.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 85.

25

Id. at 76.

26

Ferguson at 76.
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expectation of privacy” is that the results of diagnostic tests will not be shared with
non-medical personnel without her consent.28
While privacy rights prevailed in Ferguson, the balancing test employed
illustrates that the extent of privacy rights may not be well-settled. Nevertheless,
previous Supreme Court decisions indicate that privacy may appropriately be
regarded as a fundamental right.29 This treatment is justified; for without privacy an
individual’s medical records might be used to deny credit, employment, or insurance
coverage.30 Similarly, without privacy rights a person would be subject to being
embarrassed by neighbors and stigmatized or humiliated by friends and relatives.31
The right to privacy is therefore co-extensive with protecting individual dignity and
fulfills an essential role of individual autonomy and a free society.32 To protect
individual dignity, preserve personal security and allow for the pursuit of happiness,
privacy must encompass not only ‘the right to be let alone,’ but also the right to
control the release of personal and private information.33
III. MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE
“All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession or
outside of my profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not
to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never reveal.”34
-The Hippocratic Oath
The right to privacy is of paramount importance in the medical records context
because medical records contain highly sensitive information about what are
potentially the most intimate details of an individual’s life.35 Medical records often
contain demographic information such as age, sex, race, marital status, children, and
occupation; financial information, such as employment status, income, and methods
of payment; personal identifiers other than name, including social security number,
addresses, and phone numbers; and information about why treatment is sought, such
as being the victim of a violent crime, firearm injury, or the at-fault party in an auto
accident.36 They also contain information identifying whether an individual has a
27
The “special needs” asserted by the state were its’ interest in curtailing the pregnancy
costs and medical complications resulting from maternal cocaine use. Ferguson at 78.
28

Ferguson at 78.

29
Mike Hatch, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: National Health Information Privacy
Regulations Under HIPAA: Commercial Interests Win Round Two, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1481,
1487 (2002).
30

Id.

31

Id. at 1486.

32

Id.

33

Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890).
34

STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 799, cited in Hatch, supra note 29, at 1489.

35

Davis, supra note 18, at 537.

36

Hodge, supra note 11, at 791.
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communicable or other disease, or a particular genetic propensity.37 When
aggregated, this information reveals a great deal about the intimate details of a
person’s life.38 It also creates a profile of a person that may be used for
discriminatory purposes such as denying credit, employment, or insurance
coverage.39
Changes in the healthcare industry have coalesced to de-emphasize medical
records security and make health information a commodity. As medical records are
increasingly stored and transmitted in electronic media40 unauthorized disclosures or
security breaches have become more frequent.41 The centralized storage of medical
records also allows individuals to be identified in reverse.42 By searching based on
diseases rather than names, it is possible to create lists of people with specific
medical conditions.43 Employers with access to health identifiers and database
information can use these lists to wrongfully discriminate and deny jobs based on the
projected cost of a pre-existing medical condition to the company’s health plan.44
Participants in the healthcare industry may also use this information to learn about
individuals who use their products or are affected by a particular medical condition.45
They may then use this information in unsolicited marketing efforts.46
Consider too the number of people who potentially see part or all of a patient’s
medical record during a typical hospital stay. Once a patient is admitted to a
hospital, information is gathered and disseminated to a multitude of entities,47
including regulatory agencies, accreditation bodies, government departments,
insurance providers, data warehouse and storage facilities, researchers, billing and
accounting, third party benefit managers, marketers, insurers, and in some cases,
even employers.48 This is to say nothing of the multitude of healthcare employees
who view an individual’s personal health information in the course of treatment, or

37

Id.

38
Jerry Berman, The Federal Trade Commission’s Report to Congress- ‘Privacy Online:
Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace,’ testimony before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, May 25, 2000, available at
www.cdt.org/testimony/000525berman.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2002, on file with author).
39

Hatch, supra note 29, at 1490.

40

Davis, supra note 18, at 539.

41

Hatch, supra note 29, 1491.

42

Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification
Systems, 15 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 319, 358 (Spring 2002).
43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Davis, supra note 18, at 539.

46

Id.

47

Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad For Your Health?: A Introduction to the Law,
Ethics, and HIPAA Rule On Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 481, 484 (2000).
48

Davis, supra note 18, at 544-45. The HHS regulations prohibit the use of health
information by employers for job related decisions.
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the ease of access to computer terminals within the hospital setting. By some
estimates, over four hundred people are likely to see part or all of a patient’s medical
record during a typical hospital stay.49
The decrease in medical records privacy creates not only the potential for
unwarranted and possibly illegal misuse or discrimination by healthcare providers,
insurance companies, employers and marketplace participants; it may also adversely
affect the quality of care. A 1999 survey conducted by the California HealthCare
Foundation indicated that the public has reacted to the perceived decrease in medical
records privacy by engaging in privacy-protective behavior to shield themselves
from harmful and intrusive uses of health information.50 This behavior included
withholding information from healthcare providers, providing inaccurate
information, doctor-hopping to avoid a consolidated medical record, paying out-ofpocket for care that is covered by insurance and, in the most extreme cases, avoiding
care altogether.51 The survey also showed that one in five persons believe that their
personal health information had been compromised and used inappropriately, and
that one in six engaged in some form of the previously described privacy protective
conduct.52 Similarly, a Harris Equifax survey showed that over 80% of the public
respondents felt they had “lost all control” over their personal information.53 “This
has led some members of the health care industry to state that medical record privacy
is not just failing, it is ‘non-existent.’”54
IV. HIPAA: THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THREATENED MEDICAL RECORDS
PRIVACY
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government’s purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers
to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.”55
-Justice Louis Brandeis
Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(“HIPAA”) to promote the use of technology in the medical field and to standardize

49

Davis, supra note 18, at 544.

50
California HealthCare Foundation, National Survey: Confidentiality of Medical Records
(Oakland: CHCF, Jan. 1999), cited in Janlori Goldman and Zoe Hudson, Virtually Exposed:
Privacy and E-Health; Privacy concerns are keeping consumers from reaping the full benefit
of online health information, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov/Dec 2000.
51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Lawrence O. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr. and Mira S. Burghardt, Balancing Communal
Goods and Personal Privacy Under a National Health Informational Privacy Rule, 46 ST.
LOUIS J.L. 5, 6 (Winter 2002).
54

Davis, supra note 18, at 544.

55

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479.
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and streamline medical records.56 The proposed changes were designed to improve
patient care, ameliorate the healthcare system’s administrative inefficiencies, and
decrease costs through the free flow of information.57 These “administrative
simplification” provisions included the creation of a Uniform Health Identifier
(UHID) and a “national electronic collection system for personal health care data.”58
Recognizing that free flowing medical information and a UHID would reduce
privacy by making information available to those who could access the records
storage system, Congress required that medical records privacy legislation be passed
by August 21, 1999.59 Congress failed to pass that legislation and, pursuant to the
HIPAA mandate, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) was authorized to pass privacy regulations.60
HHS issued a proposed Privacy Rule in November of 1999, at which time over
50,000 public comments were received.61 These comments reflected concern over
the impact of the Rule on the healthcare industry, illustrated confusion and
misunderstanding over how it would operate, and expressed apprehension about its
complexity.62 Several thousand additional comments were received when President
Bush re-opened the comment period in efforts to re-assess regulations enacted late in
former-President Clinton’s term.63
Despite the concerns enunciated in the
comments, President Bush announced in April of 2001 that the Privacy Rule would
go into effect essentially as drafted, requiring compliance after April 2003.64

56

Rob Cunningham, Old Before Its Time: HIPAA and E-Health Policy; A Law that
Predates the Internet Explosion Needs Retrofitting to Serve as a Foundation for Standardized
Data Exchange, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov/Dec 2000.
57
Id. See also Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82462 (Dec. 28, 2000); Andrew S. Krulwich and Bruce L. McDonald, The
Vulnerability of HIPAA Regulations to First and Fourth Amendment Attack: An Addendum to
“Evolving Constitutional Privacy Doctrines Affecting Healthcare Enterprises,” 56 FOOD
DRUG L.J. 281, 282-83 (2001).
58

Sobel, supra note 42, at 325. While the idea of a UHID has “acquired the aura of a third
rail,” it indicates that if the administrative simplification provisions “are not refashioned,
federal policy will fall further behind events.” Off-the-record interview with HHS official,
June 20, 2000 cited in Cunningham, supra note 56.
59

Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 15.

60

HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 264(c)(1) (1996), cited in Gostin et al., supra note 53, at

15.
61
Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Protecting the Privacy
of Patients’ Health Information (May 9, 2001), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/
final/pvcfact2.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003, on file with author), cited in Gostin et al., supra
note 55, at 15.
62
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at
53182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).
63

Robert Pear, Bush Accepts Rules to Protect Privacy of Medical Records, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 2001, at A1, cited in Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 15, n.53.
64

Swire & Steinfeld, supra note 3, at 1524.
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The Privacy Rule begins by defining “health information,”65 then explicitly
governs a subset of that information known as “protected health information”
(“PHI”).66 PHI includes individually identifiable information transmitted and
maintained electronically or in any other form or media.67 This includes, for
example, information containing a name, Social Security Number, driver’s license
number, fingerprint, or genetic link.68 The information may be categorized as “deidentified” and no longer subject to the Rule upon finding a “very small” risk of
subject identification or upon removal of a specified list of identifiers.69 Also, truly
non-identifiable information is not subject to the Rule because there are no privacy
implications.70
The Privacy Rule applies only to “covered entities,” defined as health care
providers, health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses.71 The Rule requires, inter
alia, that they provide notice of their information practices,72 use and disclose PHI
only with patient permission except in cases of designated exceptions,73 permit
patients to access and request correction of their records,74 and provide patients an
accounting of PHI disclosure.75 “Covered entities” must also limit the use and
disclosure of PHI to the minimum necessary amount,76 implement security

65
Public Welfare General Administrative Requirements, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2003).
Health information means any information, whether written or oral or recorded in any form or
medium that: (1) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health
authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2)
relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual;
the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the
provision of health care to an individual.
66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Public Welfare Security and Privacy, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2003).

69

45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b). These identifiers include names, geographic subdivisions
smaller than a State, all elements of dates relating to an individual (e.g. those that indicate the
patient’s age), telephone numbers, fax numbers, e-mail addresses, Social Security Numbers,
medical record numbers, health plan beneficiary numbers, account numbers, certificate or
license numbers, vehicle identifiers, device identifiers, URLs, IP (Internet Provider) address
numbers, biometric identifiers such as finger and voice prints, full face photographic images,
and any other unique identifying number, characteristic or code, supra.
70

Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 17-18.

71

45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3).

72

45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a)(1).

73

45 C.F.R. § 164.512.

74

45 C.F.R. § 164.526(a).

75

45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1).

76

[A] covered entity must make reasonable efforts to limit protected health information to
the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1).
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safeguards to protect against unauthorized access or disclosure,77 and obtain
satisfactory assurances, via a written contract, that their business associates using
PHI protect the privacy of the information.78
The Rule was intended to enhance patient autonomy and promote trust in the
health care system.79 It ostensibly increases the accountability of “covered entities”
by allowing patients to access certain information contained in their files and by
regulating the covered entities’ use of PHI.80 It should also bridge the gap between
the privacy interests articulated by the Supreme Court and the personal health
information that people might choose to keep out of the public domain.81
Critics however, have described the Privacy Rule as a “regulatory oxymoron.”82
While intended to protect the privacy of personal health information, the Rule
actually sanctions non-consensual disclosure in certain instances.83 For instance,
PHI may be disclosed without patient consent: to public health authorities to prevent
or control disease or to report child abuse or neglect;84 to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to report “adverse events” and biological product deviations,
to track products, or to conduct post marketing surveillance;85 to a person who may
have been exposed to a communicable disease or who is at risk of spreading the
disease;86 and to employers regarding evaluation of the workplace, a work related
illness, or workplace medical surveillance.87 The Rule also allows nonconsensual
disclosure of PHI about victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence,88 or for
oversight of the healthcare system, government benefit programs, entities subject to
government regulatory programs, or entities subject to civil rights laws.89 Because
the Privacy Rule sanctions the non-consensual disclosure of PHI, it may
appropriately be viewed as a threat to medical records privacy.

77

45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(2).

78

45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).

79

Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 21.

80

Davis, supra note 18, at 537.

81

Id.

82

Hatch, supra note 29, at 1483.

83

Id.

84

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i) & (ii).

85

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iii).

86

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv).

87

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(v).

88

Id.

89

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(d)(1).
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V. PRIVACY RIGHTS ARE CIRCUMSCRIBED IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD
“They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety
deserve neither liberty nor safety.”90
-Benjamin Franklin
The United States Supreme Court had been expanding privacy rights prior to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but the penumbral zones of privacy
constricted following those tragic events.91 For example, privacy rights prevailed in
the pre-9/11 Ferguson case as the Court noted that a patient has a reasonable
expectation that the results of diagnostic tests will not be disclosed to non-medical
personnel without patient consent.92 Similarly, in Kyllo v. United States the Court
found that law enforcement’s use of thermal-imaging to scan an individual’s home
violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.93 Public opinion prior to 9/11 also supported expanded privacy rights, as a
Wall Street Journal poll found that Americans ranked the “erosion of personal
privacy” as one of the most serious issues in the upcoming century.94
Following 9/11, priorities clearly changed, as security issues moved to the fore of
the public mind.95 Post-9/11 polls indicating greater concern for public safety and a
noticeably lower concern for privacy issues illustrate this change.96 Public opinion
increasingly supported new forms of surveillance, including biometric identifiers97
and a national ID card.98 Concomitantly, the momentum towards increasing
individual privacy quickly shifted towards protecting national security through
greater surveillance powers than would have been proposed only a year earlier.99
The passage of the USA Patriot Act exemplifies the declining importance of
individual privacy. Its provisions grant broad and often unchecked discretion to law
enforcement officials. For example, rather than requiring a new search warrant for
each phone or computer, law enforcement officials may now access communications
from any device used by a suspect.100 Similarly, the Act increases the scope of
90

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA, available at http://www.bartleby.com/
100/245.1.html#245.note2 (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
91
Andrew S. Krulwich and Bruce L. McDonald, The Vulnerability of HIPAA Regulations
to First and Fourth Amendment Attack: An Addendum to “Evolving Constitutional Privacy
Doctrines Affecting Healthcare Enterprises,” 56 FOOD DRUG L.J. 281, 303 (2001).
92
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emergency orders used to trace communications,101 which generally apply before a
judge approves a court order.102 The Act also provides that one court order may be
used for tracing communications nationwide, rather than requiring a new order in
each jurisdiction a communications provider operates.103
The USA PATRIOT Act also changes the interpretation of many privacy oriented
statutes, which effectively restricts individual privacy rights.104 Information
developed under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act may now be used in a
wider range of cases.105 Similarly, suspects will no longer be informed that they
were under surveillance, even after the fact.106 Information developed by a grand
jury may now be shared with intelligence agencies,107 and law enforcement officials
are permitted to set up extended residence at a communications provider to monitor
the communications of unauthorized users.108 This latter expansion of power was
never even the subject of a Congressional hearing.109 The FBI may also review
sensitive personal information, including medical, financial, mental health, and
educational records, without having to show evidence of a crime and without a court
order.110
While the intent of the USA PATRIOT Act was to reduce the threat of future
terrorist attacks by increasing national security, it also has the effect of significantly
weakening the structure and limiting the coverage of many privacy protection
statutes.111 Not only can the government use its expanded powers to combat
terrorism, it can also use these powers against American citizens who are not under
criminal investigation; against immigrants, who are within American borders legally;
and against all those whose First Amendment activities are deemed to be national
security threats by the Attorney General.112 Indeed, non-terrorist suspects are now
subject to the government’s expanded ability to conduct secret searches in routine
investigations wholly unrelated to terrorism.113
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The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act evidences the circumscription of privacy
rights following 9/11. It has been described as the most sweeping expansion of
government surveillance since the passage of the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.114 Similarly, the ACLU noted that “the USA
PATRIOT Act gives enormous, unwarranted power to the executive branch
unchecked by meaningful judicial review.”115 These changes have effectively
increased the power of the government by reducing an individual’s protection against
unwanted governmental intrusion into their personal lives. 116
VI. THE THREAT TO MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY
“The experience of democracy is like the experience of life itself - always
changing, infinite in its variety, sometimes turbulent and all the more
valuable for having been tested by adversity.”117 -Jimmy Carter
The three issues described above have converged to threaten medical records
privacy. First, the increased use of technology creates greater possibility for
unauthorized access to personal health information. Healthcare providers, insurance
companies, employers and marketplace participants can use this information for
discriminatory purposes.118 Second, the Privacy Rule, which was promulgated in an
effort to address this threat, falls short of its goal because it sanctions the nonconsensual disclosure of personal health information.119 Third, privacy rights are
further threatened by their severe restriction in the wake of the September 11 terrorist
attacks, as evidenced by the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.120
The intersection of these events illustrates the tension between preserving
individual privacy rights and protecting national security. On one hand, legislators
and the judiciary attempted to strengthen medical records privacy rights by passing
the Privacy Rule. On the other, the threat of terrorism dictated that national security
be given greater priority. Increased security has had the unfortunate by-product
however, of decreasing individual privacy rights. Because these opposing interests
threaten medical records privacy, the proposed Privacy Rule must now be
scrutinized, and in some cases reworked, to create meaningful privacy protections.
Accordingly, this essay reconsiders the efficacy of the Privacy Rule in light of
circumscribed and contracting privacy rights.
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VII. CRITICISM OF THE PRIVACY RULE
“Lawyers

come

forward

when

there

are

great challenges.”121
-Alexis de Tocqueville

A. Is the Privacy Rule Unconstitutional?
There is substantial justification for the argument that the Privacy Rule is
unconstitutional under the Fourth and First Amendments.122 While this argument has
never been adjudicated in court, it was presented in The Association of American
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human
Services.123 The case was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing by the United
States District for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, but the
arguments presented illustrate the Privacy Rule’s susceptibility to a Constitutional
challenge.
1. Fourth Amendment Claims
Plaintiffs, The Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc., a
Congressman, and three patients argued that the Privacy Rule violated the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable government searches and seizures.124
Plaintiffs alleged that the Rule violates the Fourth Amendment by: (1) giving the
government virtually unrestricted access to medical records without a warrant; (2)
requiring that physicians aid government searches of patient records; and (3)
facilitating the construction of a centralized government database of PHI without
patient consent.125
In disposing of the case the court found that “a number of unlikely events must
occur in order for plaintiffs to sustain an injury.”126 The Secretary of HHS would
have had to exercise his oversight responsibility under 45 C.F.R. §160.310(c) to
request access to PHI, and would then have had to proceed directly against the
“covered entity” that possessed the PHI in question.127 Even then, Plaintiffs’
particular PHI might not even have been accessed.128
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As Plaintiffs’ PHI was not directly threatened, the Court concluded that
Plaintiffs’ allegations against HHS were “highly speculative”129 and that Plaintiffs
had neither established ripeness nor standing.130 Moreover, Plaintiffs failed to
establish that the Privacy Rule had any immediate impact on them, that a legally
protected interest had been invaded, or that they would suffer hardship resulting from
the court’s failure to consider their claims.131
The speculative nature of Plaintiffs’ injury however, is unique to the Association
of American Physicians & Surgeons case. As a counter-example, in Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, infra, MUSC violated the Fourth Amendment by disclosing the
results of diagnostic tests to local law enforcement without patient consent or a
warrant.132 Under the current draft of the Privacy Rule, this same information could
now be lawfully disclosed under the Rule’s provisions to prevent disease or child
abuse.133 Similarly, if Plaintiff’s diagnostic test results had been transmitted
electronically, the information would be subject to the USA PATRIOT Act, and
could be accessed by the FBI without a court order under its authority to review
medical information. 134
These scenarios illustrate how the intersection of technology, the Privacy Rule
and the USA PATRIOT Act abrogate privacy rights and violate the Fourth
Amendment. Ironically, information that was constitutionally protected before the
promulgation of the Privacy Rule would be subject to non-consensual disclosure
under a law designed specifically to increase privacy. Clearly, there are situations
where an application of the Privacy Rule would violate the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches, and where an injury under the Rule would
not be speculative. When the USA PATRIOT Act is added to the equation, the
threat to medical records privacy becomes glaringly apparent.
2. First Amendment Claims
Plaintiffs in Association of American Physicians & Surgeons also alleged that the
Privacy Rule violated their First Amendment right to free speech.135 They argued
that speech between patients and physicians was chilled by the mere existence of the
Rule because patients were reluctant to speak freely with their physician.136 These
allegations were dismissed as the Court found that they were subjective, and
therefore non-actionable, and that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury could not be redressed by
a favorable court decision.137
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Ferguson provides an example of how an application of the Privacy Rule would
violate the First Amendment right to free speech. If Plaintiffs in Ferguson had failed
to disclose their cocaine use to their physicians for fear that the information would be
reported to government officials under the Rule’s child abuse provisions, Plaintiffs’
speech would have been chilled.138 This chilling effect would constitute an injury to
Plaintiffs as a direct result of an application of the Privacy Rule because Plaintiffs
would have failed to speak due to a fear of disclosure under the Rule. Similarly, if
Plaintiffs’ failure to disclose their addiction harmed the child and the harm could
have been prevented by full disclosure, Plaintiffs would have been injured by an
application of the Rule. Finally, had Plaintiffs disclosed their cocaine addiction with
the understanding that those communications were confidential, and Plaintiffs were
subsequently arrested on the grounds of that communication and the urine test that
followed, Plaintiffs would have been injured by an application of the Rule. In these
scenarios, a patient would be injured under the application of the Privacy Rule,
which was promulgated in order to protect patient privacy.
B. If not Unconstitutional, the Privacy Rule is Ineffective
While finding the Privacy Rule unconstitutional might require an unusual
confluence of factors, it is nevertheless ineffective in achieving substantial medical
records privacy. First, the rate of technological change renders many of the Rule’s
provisions obsolete.139 Second, the exceptions to the consent provisions subsume
much of the privacy protection that might have otherwise been gained. Third, the
definition of a “covered entity” is so ambiguous that entities might deal with PHI but
fall outside of the definition, and therefore not be subject to the Rule. This
ambiguity is of particular concern to consumers who might inadvertently disclose
information under the mistaken belief that an entity is covered, when in fact it is not.
Fourth, the Rule presents federalism questions that must be addressed because
individual privacy has traditionally been a state function and the Privacy Rule is a
federal regulation. Finally, the government’s goal in passing the Privacy Rule was
never to protect individual privacy rights. Rather, Congress wanted to increase the
portability of health information, thereby furthering corporate interests instead of
protecting citizens against privacy violations. The Privacy Rule was an afterthought
included to more effectively market the mobility of health information. Accordingly,
while Congress recognized that privacy provisions were required to make medical
records standardization palatable, it did not go far enough.
1. The Privacy Rule Is Behind the Times
The Privacy Rule fails to address contemporary medical records storage and
transmission practices because it was based on an outdated technology model. The
Rule was promulgated under the technology model of the mid-1990s when electronic
health information was stored in large, centralized payer and provider systems.140
Technological changes now allow that information to be stored in a common cyberspace supported by Internet Service Providers (ISP’s) and accessed by Web
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browsers.141 These changes facilitate the storage and transmission of vast amounts of
data, but allow that same information to be accessed by anyone with a modem and a
PC.142
Similarly, the Privacy Rule fails to account for the prevalence of Internet use by
healthcare consumers. Indeed, the Internet is often the first destination for a patient
recently diagnosed with a health problem.143 A patient may visit any of a number of
healthcare Websites, many of which offer real-time interaction with physicians,
health risk assessments, or up-to-date information on a multitude of medical
conditions or healthcare questions.144 However, a patient must often submit a great
deal of personal information to receive on-line advice. That information is often left
behind or can be traced to its source. When collected and aggregated, this
information creates a digital profile that reveals a great deal about an individual’s
personal life, including her habits of association, speech and commerce.145
The Privacy Rule does not address the use of the Internet as a healthcare venue
where information is exchanged. Many of the privacy policies espoused by healthcare websites fall short of consumers’ expectations.146 Some of these policies do not
meet minimum fair-information practices, such as providing adequate notice, giving
users control over their information, or holding the sites’ business partners to the
same privacy standards.147 Others fail to follow their own stated privacy policies.148
Nowhere in the Privacy Rule are these shortcomings appropriately addressed.
Medical records, which were already too accessible in paper form, are now even
less secure when stored and transmitted on the Internet. The drafting of the Privacy
Rule was an opportunity to create more stringent on-line security provisions, but that
opportunity was squandered, leaving medical records exposed to potentially
unauthorized use by anyone who can access the system.149 The shortcomings of the
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Rule and its failure to address changes in the storage and transmission of medical
records render it “behind the times,” grossly inadequate and obsolete.150
2. Exceptions Swallow Additional Privacy Protections
The efficacy of the Privacy Rule is severely diminished because of the numerous
instances when patient consent is not required for a disclosure of PHI. For example,
non-consensual disclosures of PHI explicitly contemplated in the Privacy Rule
include but are not limited to, disclosure:
• to an employer regarding an evaluation of the workplace, a work related
illness, or workplace medical surveillance;151
• to the FDA to conduct post marketing surveillance, track products, or report
biological product deviations;152
• to telemarket or mail ‘health related products or services’ and ‘other
products of nominal value;’153
• to authorized patients pursuant to a court order, subpoena or other court
order;154
• to a person who may have been exposed to a communicable disease or is at
risk of spreading the disease;155
• to authorities about victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence;156
• to report child abuse or neglect;157
• to oversee healthcare systems, government benefit programs, entities
subject to government regulatory programs, or entities subject to civil rights
laws;158
• under a waiver from an Institutional Review Board or a privacy board
according to a series of considerations;159 or
• to prevent or control disease.160
While many of these disclosures might appear legitimate, their scope is so broad
that they abrogate a substantial portion of the privacy rights the Rule was intended to
create. It is too easy to use any of these reasons as a pretense to disclose PHI without
patient consent.
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Other non-consensual disclosure situations contemplated by the rule are even less
legitimate. For example, allowing the non-consensual disclosure of PHI to
telemarket or mail ‘health related products or services’ and ‘other products of
nominal value’ belies Congressional favoritism for commercial interests.161 This
provision neither bolsters patient privacy nor furthers any articulated public policy.
Similarly, allowing the non-consensual disclosure of PHI to law enforcement
officials does not infuse a patient with confidence that her personal medical
information will remain carefully guarded by her physician. Under-age drinkers,
drug users, HIV-positive individuals who have not practiced safe sex, and people
who may be a danger to themselves or others might avoid getting needed healthcare
for fear that evidence of any crime would be a reason to disclose the information to
the police.162 These scenarios are similar to the Ferguson case, and illustrate the
“docs to cops” scenario where information given to a physician in confidence is
subsequently used in a criminal investigation.163 They also illustrate how the Privacy
Rule chills communication between a doctor and patient as a reasonable patient
might not disclose certain information if she feared arrest and criminal
prosecution.164
Even if a patient does consent to the use or disclosure of PHI, that consent may
be neither informed nor consensual.165 Generally, the consent must: (1) be in plain
language, (2) inform the individual that PHI may be used and disclosed to carry out
specified activities, (3) indicate that the individual can revoke the consent in writing,
and, (4) state that the individual may request that the “covered entity” restrict how
PHI is used or disclosed for health care purposes (though the “covered entity” is not
required to agree).166 These provisions are insufficient because a patient might,
during the first visit to a physician, sign a consent form that applies to all future
disclosures and uses. The patient would not likely know the information she
consented to disclose because she typically would not know what is currently in the
records.167 Further, it would be impossible for her to know information that might be
contained in future records.168 Similarly, a patient might be coerced into consenting
to disclose PHI as healthcare providers may refuse treatment to a patient who fails to
sign an authorization form.169 Clearly, the “consent” to disclose PHI might be
neither informed nor consensual.
The effectiveness of the Privacy Rule is further curtailed because the
requirements for patient consent before a disclosure of PHI are not stringent enough.
The stated goal of the Privacy Rule was to protect patient privacy by requiring
161
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consent before a disclosure of PHI. Specifying situations in which non-consensual
disclosure of PHI is permitted severely reduces the privacy rights that might have
been gained. Furthermore, a signed patient consent form must be viewed as suspect
because it might not be truly informed, and might have been signed under duress.
Either way, these limitations impair a patient’s ability to control access to her PHI.170
3. The Nebulous Nature of a “Covered Entity”
Many healthcare activities are outside the coverage of the Privacy Rule because
they fall into the “gray zone” between traditional healthcare and what the new law
covers.171 By its own terms, the Privacy Rule applies to “covered entities,” which
consist of healthcare providers, healthcare plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and the
business associates of any of these entities.172 While these terms might seem clear at
first blush, ambiguity lurks just below the surface. For example, an entity that
appears to be covered might not be if it does not submit claims electronically.173
Providers who submit paper claims or patients who pay for care out of pocket are
therefore not covered.174 Similarly, the extent to which a “healthcare clearinghouse”
is covered is unclear. For example, will all the information collected by a website be
covered, or will coverage apply only to information collected for purposes of claims
transmission?175 Much of this ambiguity remains unresolved and will probably only
be clarified through court action.
The drafters of the Privacy Rule attempted to mitigate some of this ambiguity by
covering an entity’s “business associates.”176 A “business associate” assists a
“covered entity” in a function involving the use or disclosure of PHI.177 The
“covered entity” is responsible for the conduct of its “business associates,”178 and if
the “covered entity” fails to address a known violation it is deemed to have violated
the rule.179 While this allows HHS to regulate downstream users of PHI,180 it creates
as many problems as it solves by forcing the renegotiation of hundreds of thousands
of contracts.181
170

Hatch, supra note 29, at 1485.

171

Goldman, supra note 146.

172

45 C.F.R. §160.102, cited in Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 19.

173

Goldman, supra note 146.

174

Id.

175

Id.

176

45 C.F.R. §160.103.

177

Not-for-attribution interview with U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
(HELP) Committee staff member, July 21, 2000, cited in, Cunningham, supra note 56.
178

Cunningham, supra note 56.

179

Gostin et al., supra note 53, at 20.

180

Id.

181

Charles N. Kahn, III, president, Health Insurance Association of America,
“Confidentiality of Health Information,” statement before the Senate HELP Committee, April
26, 2000, cited in Cunningham, supra note 56.

2002-03] A TRIPARTITE THREAT TO MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY

291

The ambiguous definition of a “covered entity” and its “business associates” also
potentially restricts speech about an individual’s PHI.182 For example, a consumer
might be confused over whether an activity is regulated by the Privacy Rule.183 This
would be most common in internet transactions where a consumer might disclose
personal health information under the mistaken belief that the website was
covered.184 Conversely, the ambiguity might make a patient reluctant to discuss
medical conditions with legitimate members of the healthcare community, including
physicians. Ferguson addressed this concern, noting that “an intrusion on that
expectation [of privacy] may have adverse consequences because it may deter
patients from receiving needed medical care.”185
The failure to adequately define a “covered entity” is not necessarily damning for
the Privacy Rule, but it does create unnecessary confusion. The electronic
transmission requirement limits entities that are actually covered. Similarly, the
extent to which information processed by “healthcare clearinghouses” is covered is
unclear. This lack of clarity could have adverse consequences for consumers who
might inadvertently disclose personal health information to entities that are not
covered. Conversely, consumers might be less willing to speak candidly with
legitimate and covered healthcare providers for fear that they are not covered.
4. Federalism Concerns
The Privacy Rule has unresolved federalism conflicts because it seeks to
nationalize individual privacy rights, which have traditionally been a state concern.
The Rule creates a nationally uniform “floor” of privacy protections by providing
that the federal regulation will not preempt state laws that are more stringent in
protecting patient privacy.186 The common law physician-patient privilege illustrates
however, that the protection of individual medical privacy has traditionally been a
state concern.187 The intersection of these interests clearly has federalism
implications because state and federal interests collide.188
Resolving the federalism issue will involve balancing the Supremacy Clause189
against the 10th Amendment,190 and the Supremacy Clause will likely prevail. Some
academics have argued that the regulation of health information privacy should
remain within the ambit of traditional state power.191 This proposal is problematic
however, because it creates multiple standards. For instance, individuals in some
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states will enjoy greater privacy protections than in others. Similarly, “covered
entities” will be required to adhere to both national and State privacy standards.192
Tipping the balance in favor of adopting a uniform federal regulation are changes in
the healthcare industry that make medical records transmission a subject of interstate
commerce. As the District Court noted in The Association of American Physicians
and Surgeons, the Privacy Rule regulates interstate economic activity because
healthcare plans operate across state lines.193 Accordingly, Congress will likely be
able to invoke its Commerce Clause powers to nationally regulate the transmission
of medical records.194
The creation of multiple privacy standards also reveals inconsistencies within the
Privacy Rule. The goal of HIPAA was the administrative simplification of the
healthcare system.195 The Rule controverts this goal however, by creating multiple
privacy standards. Rather than simplifying the provision of healthcare, the twotiered approach to privacy protection complicates the provision of healthcare because
providers and must comply with both national and regional privacy standards.
The benefit of enacting a uniform national privacy standard was further
exemplified in United States ex rel. Mary Jane Stewart v. The Louisiana Clinic
where the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana easily
circumvented a state law that was allegedly more stringent than the federal
standard.196 Relators in a qui tam action alleged that Defendants defrauded the
federal government by presenting false claims for medical service reimbursements.
Defendants, in an effort to protect patient privacy, sought a protective order
concerning the disclosure of patient billing and medical records.197 They argued that
they were subject to civil liability under a Louisiana law preventing the disclosure of
those records, and that this law was not pre-empted by the Privacy Rule because it
exceeded the federal standard.198
In requiring that the PHI in question be produced in unredacted form, the court
found that the Louisiana statute was not more stringent than the federal standard
because the Louisiana law did not address “the form, substance, or the need for
express legal permission from an individual” as required by the Privacy Rule.199
Because the Louisiana law did not fit explicitly within the exception carved out by
the Privacy Rule, the “stringency” exception did not apply. Defendants were
therefore required to produce unredacted PHI containing patient identifiers.200 In an
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effort to protect the confidential nature of this information the court limited
recipients to counsel of record, two paralegals and one expert for each party.201 The
limitation was ineffective however, because the court also concluded that the United
States could use information gained in this discovery proceeding in connection with
its oversight of healthcare activities.
The impact of this case is threefold. First, it illustrates the benefit of a nationally
uniform privacy standard because the addition of the state law caused unnecessary
confusion. Absent the state law- federal law controversy, the controlling authority
would be clear and the case likely would not have been litigated. Second, the case
illustrates how easily the “stringency” provision of the Privacy Rule can be
circumvented. Accordingly, this provision creates an ineffective distinction between
allegedly more stringent State standards and the national Privacy Rule. Third, the
decision illustrates the Rule’s shortcoming in protecting individual medical records
privacy. While the court sought to limit the disclosure of PHI to counsel of record,
two paralegals and one expert for each party, once the PHI is used for government
oversight purposes the number of people who could potentially view the unredacted
PHI in question is limitless.
5. Congress was Catering to Corporate Interests
A final problem with the Privacy Rule is its suspect motivation. The Rule was
passed in an effort to mitigate the consequences of standardizing and streamlining
medical records202 rather than to advance individual privacy interests.203 It
exemplifies an attempt to balance community interests against individual rights,204
illustrating compromises between privacy advocates and industry leaders.205 While
these compromises were made in an effort to placate those concerned about
unwarranted access to medical records, it is important to recall that the Rule does not
represent beneficent government action to protect the privacy of personal health
information.206 Rather it is an example of Congress putting “big-money corporate
interests ahead of the basic privacy interests of the American people.”207 In
considering the efficacy of the Privacy Rule, it is therefore illuminating to recall that
it was an afterthought on the heels of administrative simplification. This commercial
favoritism, exemplified by permitting the non-consensual disclosure of PHI for
marketing and fundraising purposes,208 can be explained by government officials
who succumbed to powerful lobbying groups that have a stake in obtaining personal
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health information.209 While this situation is typical, it is nevertheless important to
recall that the government had a pre-textual profiteering motive and was not acting
simply to protect individual privacy rights.
VII. ALL IS NOT LOST
“Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to
better.”210
-Richard Hooker
The Privacy Rule fails to address significant issues regarding the erosion of
medical records privacy. These gaps result from the confluence of increased
technology use in medical records storage, the enactment of the Privacy Rule, and
the restriction of privacy rights following 9/11, as evidenced by the passage of the
USA PATRIOT Act. While the Privacy Rule was ostensibly promulgated in order to
protect medical records privacy, its provisions do not go far enough. First, the Rule
is based on an out-of-date technology model. Second, the exceptions to the patient
consent provisions swallow much of the privacy protection that would have been
gained. Third, the Rule fails to adequately define a “covered entity.” Fourth, it has
unresolved federalist issues. Finally, the supposed privacy protections are suspect
because Congress was catering to corporate interests rather than protecting
individual rights. Despite these obstacles to creating effective medical records
privacy, the government can still protect privacy rights while advancing national
security interests.211
One of the clearest solutions to problems in the current draft of the Privacy Rule
is to change the offending provisions. For instance, the narrow definition of a
“covered entity,” which allows some entities that deal with PHI to fall outside its
coverage, could be broadened to include any entity that deals with PHI. This change
would truly protect personal health information by requiring any entity that deals
with it to follow the strictures of the Privacy Rule. A broader definition would
facilitate enforcement of the Rule by clarifying the guidelines. It would also reduce
patient confusion because patients could be secure in their knowledge that any entity
to which they submitted PHI would be subject to the Privacy Rule.
Similarly, the conditions under which PHI may be disclosed without patient
consent should be narrowed to include only those instances where non-consensual
disclosure is absolutely necessary. While there are clearly instances when nonconsensual disclosure of PHI is required, those instances must be strictly limited if
the Privacy Rule is to have any substantial effect.
The decision to disclose PHI without patient consent should be considered
against the backdrop of the physician-patient privilege. This tradition protects
conversations between physician and patient and clearly exists because of the
intimate nature of personal health information. The legislature should defer to
tradition in this instance, treading carefully before abrogating this important and
fundamental duty of confidentiality. Similarly, legislators should be particularly
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careful to protect the privacy of personal health information in light of the threat to
medical records privacy posed by the increased use of technology. They should
recognize the relevance of a long-standing protection, and utilize it to account for
continuing changes in the use of technology.
Technology however, can be used to increase medical records security. In
passing HIPAA, Congress recognized the shift to electronic storage and transmission
of medical records. In addition to allowing for the standardizing and streamlining of
medical records, this shift also provides an opportunity to implement sound data
handling practices throughout the healthcare industry.212 Technology companies
currently have available privacy enhancing features such as encryption, on-line optin buttons, and anonomymizers that can be used to increase security on the web, in email transmissions, and in data storage.213 These devices should be used to increase
the security of personal health information, which will facilitate greater medical
records privacy by carefully controlling who has access to information storage and
transmission systems and how such access is regulated.
Because the judiciary will ultimately interpret enforcement of the Privacy Rule, it
should be drafted to consistently protect medical records privacy. This may be
accomplished by upholding a patient’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”214 The
current draft of the Rule moved in that direction by establishing a “floor” of privacy
protections, but the solidity of this “floor” is questionable because it has unresolved
federalism issues. Congress might therefore be justified in pre-empting State
legislation on medical records privacy issues under the Commerce Clause, which
would eliminate discrepant standards between States, facilitate compliance by
“covered entities,” and provide patients with a uniform standard of protection.
In changing the text of the Privacy Rule, HHS might also consider internal
restructuring in order to more effectively deal with privacy issues. For instance,
HHS could create a system similar to the issuing of a temporary restraining order
where a “covered entity” must contact a judge or regulatory agency before disclosing
PHI without patient consent. That judge or agency could be empowered to quickly
decide whether the non-consensual disclosure of PHI is warranted. Similarly, HHS
could appoint regional staff members who would be consulted about non-consensual
disclosures of PHI. HHS could also create a sub-agency to deal specifically with
medical records privacy issues. These new agencies or staff members might operate
as a board, or as a quasi-judicial system that would decide whether non-consensual
disclosures of PHI are warranted. Whatever form this institution would take, its goal
should be to ensure that a patient’s reasonable expectation of privacy remains
relatively constant.
VIII. CONCLUSION
“Law is order, and good law is good order.”215

-Aristotle
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The protection of medical records privacy is an important and pervasive issue.
While individual privacy rights had expanded prior to 9/11, they have been severely
restricted following those tragic events. In light of contracting privacy rights, the
protection of medical records privacy becomes even more important, particularly
when one considers that privacy is more easily subject to transgression as a result of
the increased use of technology to store and transmit medical records, and the
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. Accordingly, the Privacy Rule, which was
promulgated in an effort to protect individual medical privacy rights, must be reexamined to ascertain whether it can withstand these new challenges.
Upon re-examination of the Privacy Rule, its shortcomings become glaringly
apparent. While this does not mean that the Privacy Rule must be discarded, it
indicates that the Rule must be altered if substantial privacy protection is to be
preserved. These alterations include broadening the scope of the Rule and requiring
that currently available technology security devices be utilized to substantially
protect the privacy of medical records. Congress should also consider pre-empting
State privacy protections in favor of a uniform national standard, as well as
restructuring agencies in order to provide meaningful privacy protection. Through
this continued re-tooling of the Privacy Rule, Congress can defend against the
tripartite threat to medical records privacy, and in so doing preserve individual
privacy, dignity and autonomy.
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